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Abstract
Background: Integrating medical data using databases from different sources by record linkage is a powerful
technique increasingly used in medical research. Under many jurisdictions, unique personal identifiers needed for
linking the records are unavailable. Since sensitive attributes, such as names, have to be used instead, privacy
regulations usually demand encrypting these identifiers. The corresponding set of techniques for privacy-preserving
record linkage (PPRL) has received widespread attention. One recent method is based on Bloom filters. Due to
superior resilience against cryptographic attacks, composite Bloom filters (cryptographic long-term keys, CLKs) are
considered best practice for privacy in PPRL. Real-world performance of these techniques using large-scale data is
unknown up to now.
Methods: Using a large subset of Australian hospital admission data, we tested the performance of an innovative
PPRL technique (CLKs using multibit trees) against a gold-standard derived from clear-text probabilistic record linkage.
Linkage time and linkage quality (recall, precision and F-measure) were evaluated.
Results: Clear text probabilistic linkage resulted in marginally higher precision and recall than CLKs. PPRL required
more computing time but 5 million records could still be de-duplicated within one day. However, the PPRL approach
required fine tuning of parameters.
Conclusions: We argue that increased privacy of PPRL comes with the price of small losses in precision and recall
and a large increase in computational burden and setup time. These costs seem to be acceptable in most applied
settings, but they have to be considered in the decision to apply PPRL. Further research on the optimal automatic
choice of parameters is needed.
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Background
In medical research, information on patients is often scat-
tered across different databases of several data holders.
The task of finding records referring to the same per-
son across one or more datasets is, in medical contexts,
denoted as record linkage. Linking databases is a valuable
and cost-effective technique, increasingly used in pub-
lic health [1, 2], official statistics [3, 4], medical service
research [1, 5], pharmacovigilance [6] and demographic
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research [7]. Applications of record linkage in medi-
cal informatics enabled new research on topics such as
increased mortality risk after imprisonment [8], increased
risk of road traffic accidents after treatments for drug
overdoses [9] or mortality for hepatitis C and HIV vs.
non-HIV patients [10].
For many research endeavors, linking the information
needed would be trivial if a unique personal identifier
(PID) is available. However, in many settings, legal and
administrative issues prevent the use of PIDs, restricting
data linkage to personal identifiers such as names. Since
this requires the release of personally identifying informa-
tion to trusted third parties [11], privacy regulations, such
as the HIPAA Privacy Rules [12] or current EU regulations
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[13], often mandate using encrypted personal informa-
tion. Standard probabilistic record linkagemethods [3] are
sometimes unsuitable for methods based on encrypted
identifiers.
A number of new record linkage methods have been
developed to overcome this problem at a technical level.
These methods, known collectively as privacy-preserving
record linkage, allow linkages using encrypted identifiers.
Although no personal identifying information is released
by data custodians, record linkage is still possible.
A summary of privacy-preserving record linkage tech-
niques notes that each method differs in its accuracy,
maturity, practicality and suitability for large-scale link-
ages [14]. Few of the available privacy-preserving linkage
techniques are suitable for operational linkage units [15].
One notable method for privacy-preserving record link-
age utilises Bloom filters to enable linkage [16]. The Bloom
filters main advantage over many other approaches is that
it incorporates uncertainty into matching, allowing the
similarity between two fields to bemeasured (for instance,
between two surnames) – a method regularly used in tra-
ditional unencrypted record linkage that typically yields
high quality. The original Bloom filter approach encodes
each field into a separate Bloom filter (a binary vector)
which is then compared for similarity using a measure
such as the Sørensen-Dice coefficient or Jaccard index.
The Dice coefficient of Bloom filter-encrypted identi-
fiers seems to be comparable to the similarity of a Jaro-
Winkler comparison on unencrypted identifiers [17]. As
encryption occurs on individual fields, standard record
linkage procedures can still be used such as blocking (to
reduce the comparison space and allow timely linkage to
occur) and the assignment of weights to particular fields.
Real-world evaluations show similar linkage quality when
comparing Bloom filter-based methods with clear-text
probabilistic record linkage [15].
Alternate methods of privacy-preserving record linkage
using Bloom filters have been developed, with a single
Bloom filter composed from many identifiers. Reasons
for using only a single Bloom filter for linkage include
legal constraints in some jurisdictions [18] and attempts at
improving the privacy of the data [19, 20]. A record-level
Bloom filter (RBF) combines all fields into a single Bloom
filter using the discriminatory power of each field [20].
Fields with a higher discriminatory power are allocated a
larger proportion of bits within the RBF, with some bits
excluded completely to maximise privacy. Another com-
posite Bloom filter approach uses a basic set of identifiers
to produce a cryptographic long-term key or CLK [19].
This was developed as an irreversibly encrypted, anony-
mous linkage code, that allowed for small typographical
errors in the identifiers.
Both of these composite Bloom filtermethods have been
shown to increase privacy by reducing the chance of a
successful, malicious attack [21, 22]. However, the ability
of composite Bloom filters to perform highly accurately
and efficiently on large real-world data is unknown. As
there are no individual fields, indexing (or blocking) meth-
ods such as standard Blocking [3] cannot be used without
blocking externally on a separate, encrypted identifier.
Other approaches to indexing encrypted identifiers, such
as the Sorted Neighbourhood Method [23] and Canopy
Clustering [24], have been developed, yet neither show
optimal performance in all settings [25]. Another recently
introduced method using multibit trees has been shown
to be very suitable for CLKs, with potential for good qual-
ity linkage, and with performance at least as good as other
methods on synthetic data [26].
In this paper, we test the accuracy and efficiency of
the multibit tree technique on CLKs generated from large
real-world medical data, for which the true links (which
records belong to the same person) are already known.
Testing multibit trees on real-world data is an important
step in verifying its viability for linking record-level Bloom
filters in public health settings.
Methods
Datasets
Ten years of Western Australian (WA) Hospital Admis-
sions data, along with ten years of New South Wales
(NSW) Admitted Patient Data were used in this evalua-
tion. For each of these datasets, we had pre-existing and
accurate information about which records belonged to
which person.
The datasets had been de-duplicated previously (by the
WA Data Linkage Branch (WADLB) [27] and the Centre
for Health Record Linkage (CHeReL) [28] respectively).
De-duplication was undertaken using a variety of meth-
ods including exact matching, probabilistic linkage, and
intensive clerical review. WADLB and CHeReL employed
rigorous manual reviews of created links and a quality
assurance program to analyse and review likely errors.
These links have been further validated through use in a
large number of research projects and published research
articles [29], and are used as a ‘truth set’ for linkage quality
estimations.
A summary of these datasets can be found in Table 1.
The NSW Morbidity data has been separated into pub-
lic and private hospital data. The private hospital data
contains no name information.
Linkage quality metrics
Linkage quality was evaluated using pairwise precision,
recall, and F-measure. Precision refers to the proportion
of incorrect links found from all the found links and thus
provides a measure of false positives. Recall is the pro-
portion of all correct links found, and thus measures false
negatives. The F-measure is the harmonic mean between
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First Name 3% 100% < 1%
Middle Name 54% 100% 41%
Last Name < 1% 100% < 1%
Date of Birth 0% 0% < 1%
Sex < 1% < 1% < 1%
Suburb < 1% 3% < 1%
Address 2% 22% < 1%
Postcode < 1% 3% < 1%
# Records 13810088 6498579 6772949
precision and recall, giving a single figure from which we
can compare results. These measures are widely used in
the record linkage literature [16, 30].
CLKmethod
The CLK encryption method is based on the idea of hash-
ing all available personal identifiers into a single structure
called a Bloom filter (a binary vector). Each Bloom filters
is used as an encrypted linkage key and can then be com-
pared with other keys, resulting in a score which describes
how similar the Bloom filters (and thus the personally
identifying information) are.
Four different parameter sets were tested, which cor-
responded to different choices of personal identifiers to
combine into each CLK, and are outlined in Table 2.
These parameter sets replicate typical blocking and link-
age options in traditional record linkage.
Consistent with the CLK construction method sug-
gested by Schnell et al. [19], each dataset was transformed
into four CLK files, one for each parameter set. All CLKs
were 1000 bits in length. Each identifier in the parameter
set used to make up the CLK (i.e. first name, date of birth,
etc.) was converted into unigrams (individual characters)
or bigrams (sets of two overlapping characters) with each
Table 2 Identifiers used for each parameter set
Identifier
Parameter sets Average
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 length
First Name ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5
Middle Name ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ 5
Last Name ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
Date of birth ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Sex ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1
Suburb ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 8
Address ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ 17
Postcode ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 4
unigram or bigram hashed 10 times. The modulus of each
hash with respect to the Bloom filter was taken, and this
position in the Bloom filter set to 1.
Pairs of Bloom filters are compared using the Jaccard, or
Tanimoto, similarity. The intersection of the bit positions
set to one in both Bloom filters is divided by the union
of the bit positions set to one in the two Bloom filters.
This results in a similarity score between 0 and 1, where a
higher score reflects a greater similarity measure:
J(A,B) = |A ∩ B||A ∪ B|
Security of CLKs and Bloom filters
The desirable property of all Bloom filter-based encryp-
tions is that they are similarity-preserving. This presents
security considerations, as this property can be exploited
to attack the encryption and potentially reveal personal
identifiers. In recent years, several attacks have been pub-
lished. The first attack, proposed by Kuzu et al. [21],
revealed personal identifiers by performing a frequency
analysis of individual fields. A discussion on the scope and
limitations of the attack is given by Schnell and Borgs [31].
A second attack was devised by Niedermeyer et al. [32]
and extended by Kroll and Steinmetzer [33], which focuses
on the frequency distributions of the bit patterns of Bloom
filters, as well as CLKs. The attack was very successful in
decoding CLKs using the double-hashing scheme as pro-
posed in the original publication [16]. However, replacing
the double-hashing scheme with full random hashing pre-
vents the attack [31]. Several other hardening techniques
have been proposed to make CLKs more resilient against
bit-pattern based attacks [31, 34]. For example, using a sta-
ble identifier as an additional part of the secret (password)
used for encryption is suggested by [32] as a hardening
method (salting). Currently, there are no published attacks
on such variants of the CLK construction.
Multibit trees
Searching for similar pairs is computationally expensive.
To reduce the search space and thus improve linkage
speeds, tree-based structures can be used for blocking.
One prominent method is the use of multibit trees, as sug-
gested by Kristensen et al. [35] and suggested for PPRL
by Bachteler et al. [36]. Multibit trees show better perfor-
mance in terms of quality and linkage speed than most
current methods, like Canopy Clustering [26], LSH-based
blocking [37] or PPJoin [38]. A tree structure is con-
structed for one record file by finding multiple match bit
positions in all Bloom filters where approximately half
the records have their bit position set to one, while the
other half exhibits a value of zero. Each of these halves
are called leaves. This split-half technique is repeated until
a user-defined minimum number of records in each leaf
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is reached (usually one to eight records). For our experi-
ments, a leaf limit of one was used.
To find similar pairs in terms of Tanimoto-similarity,
every record in the second dataset is queried sequen-
tially. For each record, an upper bound of the Tanimoto-
similarity can be estimated before the actual similarity
calculation, by comparing the values at the bit positions
of each leaf in the tree. Leaves with a similarity under a
user-defined Tanimoto threshold are disregarded in the
calculation of the similarities. This way, the search space
can be reduced drastically.
For our de-duplication linkages, the same dataset was
used for the multibit tree and for the sequential queries.
We applied a construction method for multibit trees sim-
ilar to Bachteler et al. [36], testing multiple Tanimoto
thresholds for each parameter set.
Evaluation strategy
All NSW and WA datasets were encrypted into CLKs
for each parameter set as described above. For testing of
linkage quality and blocking ability on data with few miss-
ing values, the WA CLK dataset was then de-duplicated,
using multibit trees as the blocking method, at a range
of Tanimoto thresholds. For testing of linkage quality on
data with many missing values, a random sample of 5
million records was taken from the combined NSW CLK
datasets using parameter set 1 (first name, last name, date
of birth and sex). This represents a reasonable sample
size for a real-world operation, the name identifiers result-
ing in approximately 30% missing values. The pair-wise
precision, recall and F-measure scores were calculated by
comparing results to the ‘truth set.’
For testing of performance, the NSW (Public Hospi-
tal) and WA CLK datasets were combined for a dataset
with a total of approximately 20 million records. From
this combined dataset, random samples were taken to
create datasets of 5, 10 and 15 million records. All of
these datasets were then de-duplicated, using multibit
trees with a single Tanimoto threshold of 0.85, as this has
previously been shown to be a reasonable value for most
applications [26]. The execution time of the multibit tree
search was recorded.
All de-duplication linkages used multibit trees with a
leaf limit value of one. The multibit tree outputs all candi-
date pairs, where the criterion for a pair is that it exceeds
the given Tanimoto threshold value.
The evaluation was run on a Windows Server 2012
R2 Virtual Machine, running under ESXi on a Cisco
UCSC-C240-M3S Server with Intel Xeon CPU E5-
2609@2.40GHz. The VM was assigned 48GB RAM and 6
vCPUs. The evaluation code was assigned 4 vCPUs.
Results
Linkage quality
Results for the de-duplication of the WA CLK dataset
can be found in Fig. 1. The highest recall value across
all threshold levels was achieved using parameter set 1
(first name, last name, date of birth, sex), with the best
value of 0.986 at a threshold of 0.8. The next highest recall
was achieved using parameter set 4 (first name, middle
name, last name, date of birth, sex). The two lowest recall
values came from the use of parameter sets 2 and 3. Val-
ues for parameter set 3 at Tanimoto thresholds 0.8 and
0.85 are not provided as these runs failed to complete
successfully.
MaximumF-measure varied considerably across the dif-
ferent parameter sets. Highest F-measure was 0.978 from
parameter set 1 while lowest F-measure was 0.781 for
parameter set 3. The inclusion of address information
(parameter sets 2 and 3) tended to reduce overall scores.
This can be explained by the varying recall: including
addresses introduces unstable identifiers, which either dif-
fer in the datasets (e.g. because individuals have moved
to a different address) or are missing. This will lead to a
Fig. 1 Linkage quality results for WA CLK de-duplication
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reduction in the amount of true pairs found, which is why
sets 1 and 4 show superior linkage quality with respect to
recall.
All parameter sets but set 1 show high precision
scores. Since adding middle names allows for bet-
ter discrimination between records that would other-
wise exhibit the same values across all identifiers, the
amount of false positive classifications will decrease, lead-
ing to increased precision values for these parameter
sets.
The de-duplication linkage of the 5 million sample CLK
dataset of the combined NSW Public and Private Hospi-
tal datasets (30% of all rows had missing name identifiers)
was abandoned after 2 weeks of elapsed execution time.
Analysis of the pairs created to that point showed that the
number of missing identifiers in the CLKs was leading to
the creation of an inordinately large number of false pos-
itives; a large portion of rows with only values for date of
birth and sex appeared to be linking to each other. The
anticipated poor linkage results and excessive processing
time led to the decision to abandon all linkage quality tests
with this particular dataset.
Performance
The time taken to complete the de-duplication of the sam-
ples of our combined dataset was a monotone function
of the sample size (see Fig. 2). The smallest sample of 5
million records took just under a day to complete. For the
large dataset sizes, the run time slowed considerably, tak-
ing one month to complete the 20 million de-duplication
linkage.
The results in Fig. 2 include the time taken to run
the de-duplication of the WA CLK dataset (6.8 million
records) was 2,445 minutes. When the same dataset was
split into ten roughly equal parts with blocking on year
of birth, the total time taken to de-duplicate was 1,828
minutes.
Fig. 2 Performance results for combined CLK dataset de-duplication
Discussion
Overall, the use of CLK with multibit trees for a full link-
age was not as high quality as could be achieved using
either unencrypted linkage or with field level Bloom fil-
ters [16]. Using the same dataset (WA Hospital), both
unencrypted and field level Bloom filters had achieved
an F-measure of 0.99 [15], while this measure achieved
a maximum F-measure of 0.978 in our current evalua-
tion. Overall, this difference is small, and this may be
acceptable, particularly in cases where the use of a sin-
gle data item for anonymous linkage is prescribed by
law [18].
Our results show that the use of multibit trees for
indexing/blocking of CLK data has great potential. The
best recall was achieved using parameter set 1, with a
value of 0.9858 at a threshold of 0.8. The unencrypted
linkage on the same dataset, mentioned previously, had
a recall of just 0.981, using standard blocking. The worst
results for recall were for parameter sets 2 and 3, with
values at all thresholds below 0.75. This is unacceptably
low for any linkage, but the inclusion of all identifiers,
especially with volatile address information, precludes
the ability to match individuals that have changed their
address. This shows, that while including more identi-
fiers in the CLKs will usually increase the discriminative
power, leading to higher precision, stable identifiers with-
out missing data fields are needed in order to avoid
sacrificing recall. While using multibit trees for indexing
of CLK data has the ability for a very high coverage of
possible links, its quality is ultimately determined by the
identifiers used to create the CLK and the quality of the
data.
In terms of performance, the linkages were reason-
ably slow. While operational linkages are commonly per-
formed on an ad-hoc basis, and there are tight processing
deadlines to meet, linkages which take more than a few
days processing time are probably not feasible. As such,
the multibit tree method, as it is currently implemented,
could not be recommended for large-scale linkages. As
a comparison, an unencrypted linkage of the same 20
million records can be completed within a day.
An alternate approach to using the multibit tree method
may be to create a set of hashed blocking variables along-
side the CLK, referred to as external blocking [26]. Our
simple external blocking of the WA CLK dataset into just
ten blocks based on year of birth was enough to reduce the
execution time by 25%. In practice, the external blocking
required to maintain linkage quality is likely to be more
complex, requiring additional information alongside the
CLK and may provide an additional attack vector for a
malicious individual. However, external blocking provides
a considerably faster method for linkage with CLKs, and
at this time is a practical way for large-scale private record
linkage.
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Conclusion
Further testing is required to improve the CLK linkage
results. One factor which is likely to improve results is the
use of methods of weighting different personal identifiers
based on how likely they are to identify an individual. The
impact that a field has within a Bloom filter is directly
proportional to how many bits that field encodes. How-
ever, in this paper, we used the baseline approach, where
the number of bits was solely based on the number of
bigrams in the identifier. For example, addresses usually
contain many bigrams but are far less useful in identifying
an individual over time when compared to date of birth
or name. Testing Bloom filters which weight individual
fields (by hashing bigrams more or less often) according
to their usefulness in identifying individuals (discrimi-
nating power) may be an important avenue of further
research.
The results reported here are heavily dependent on
parameter settings. For these methods to be useful in
practice, where ‘truth sets’ are usually not available, tried
and tested parameter settings that are robust across dif-
ferent kinds of datasets are required. Missing values were
also shown to be a major factor affecting the quality of
the indexing and linkage. Since CLKs do not account for
the number of identifiers for which valid information is
present, calculation of similarities based on CLKs will
be attenuated by asymetrically missing identifiers. How-
ever, handling missing identifiers in PPRL is a largely
unexplored field of research.
Demand for privacy-preserving record linkage is
increasing [39]. Security of PPRL solutions against
cryptographic attacks is therefore of utmost importance
in medical settings.
However, very few techniques for PPRL suitable for
large data sets are available. One of these few techniques
are Bloom filter-based methods for PPRL. These meth-
ods are increasingly used for a wide variety of medical
research projects, such as linkingmammography data [40]
or building a national perinatal database [41]. State of
the art variants of Bloom filter-based methods have been
shown to be more resilient than competing approaches
[31]. Successful attacks on these variants seem to be
harder than the effort which can be expected willingly to
be provided by a rational attacker [42]. Further hardening
Bloom filters is subject of ongoing research by our group.
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